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Abstract. Th e semiosphere is arguably the most infl uential concept developed by 
Juri Lotman, which has been reinterpreted in a variety of ways. Th is paper returns 
to Lotman’s original “anthropocentric” understanding of semiosphere as a collective 
intellect/consciousness and revisits the main arguments of Lotman’s discussion of 
human vs. nonhuman semiosis in order to position it in the modern context of 
cognitive semiotics and the question of human uniqueness in particular. In contrast 
to the majority of works that focus on symbolic consciousness and multimodal 
communication as specifi cally human traits, Lotman accentuates polyglottism and 
dialogicity as the unique features of human culture. Formulated in this manner, the 
concept of semiosphere is used as a conceptual framework for the study of human 
cognition as well as human cognitive evolution. 
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Th e concept of semiosphere is arguably the most infl uential concept developed by 
the semiotician and literary scholar Juri Lotman (1922–1993), a leader of the Tartu-
Moscow School of Semiotics and a founder of semiotics of culture. In a way, it was 
the pinnacle of Lotman’s lifelong study of culture as an intrinsic component of human 
individual and collective consciousness and as a precondition of all modelling processes, 
including cognition and thinking. It was also the synthesis of the core principles of 
Lotman’s semiotics that can be formulated as the principle of cultural isomorphism – 
which postulates that all semiotic entities from individual consciousness to the totality of 
human culture are based on similar heterogeneous mechanisms of meaning-generation – 
and the principle of textuality of culture, the assumption that culture is an exceptionally 
complex text that in turn consists of texts within texts. 
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Th e purpose of this paper is to position Lotman’s concept in the modern context of 
cognitive semiotics and the question of human uniqueness in particular. Although I 
do not strive to reconstruct the chronology of Lotman’s work in detail, it is important 
to pay heed to some important concepts that Lotman developed throughout his 
academic career and that later crystallized into the concept of the semiosphere. One 
of such concepts was the notion of text as a meaning-generating mechanism. 
Text and dialogue 
During the 1960–70s, the most oft -repeated thesis in Lotman’s works was that any 
meaningful message can only be produced at the intersection of at least two languages 
and that in order to refl ect a given reality at least two languages are needed (see Lotman 
1977: 298, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1987b, 1988, 1990: 3, 77, 1992c, 1992d). Consequently, the 
text appears to be a polyglot and dialogic entity, and the concept of translation lies at 
the base of the process of meaning generation and cognition as such. 
Already in Th e Structure of the Artistic Text (1970), Lotman states that the 
communication in culture is eff ectuated between two polyglots, who actively choose 
the best possible language in order to produce and receive a message (Lotman 1977: 
73). Furthermore, Lotman (2005: 218–219) rejects the traditional (and essentially 
Saussurian) scheme of communication language > text > dialogue, in which texts 
are products of the language system. He proposes another model:
dialogic situation > real dialogue > text > languages 
and stresses that the dialogic situation “precedes both real dialogue and even the 
existence of a language” (Lotman 1990: 143–144). Obviously, Lotman’s understanding 
of language or code is much broader than the strict defi nition applied to natural 
language only. Codes include such semiotic systems as natural language, cinema, 
music, limited-use systems such as traffi  c signs or computer codes, and even genres 
and styles; in other words, any structure that is able to generate meaning. Most 
importantly, Lotman’s model emphasizes the creative function of the text alongside the 
function of information transfer. Meaning is therefore not a static relation of a signifi er 
and its signifi ed but a process of interpretation that happens at the intersection of 
diff erent, albeit overlapping languages (Fig. 1). Th is creates a paradox if we assume 
that language should only transfer information as correctly as possible and without 
any hindrances or “noise”. Should we then admit that our languages are quite poorly 
designed? Quite the opposite, Lotman (1990: 15) argues that it is exactly this creative 
function of a text and the constant overlapping of numerous non-equivalent codes that 
makes possible the generation of meaning. 
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Figure 1. Th e asymmetrical translation (adapted from Lotman 1990: 15). 
T1 represents the original text; C1, C2, Cn represent a plural space of overlapping, but not 
identical, codes; T21,2,n represent the plurality of possible texts on the receiver’s end.
Th e postulate of the primacy of dialogue before language is not just a paradox for 
the sake of paradox but represents a quite pragmatic approach to communication. 
Th ere are countless examples in our everyday communication that show that the need 
to impart a message precedes the creation of the message. For example, if I need to 
express that I like somebody, I will structure the message using one or several semiotic 
systems, based on the character of the assumed dialogue and the way I want to impart 
it to an addressee. I may say it in English or in another language; I may write a text 
to share it on social networks or to keep it for myself; I may create a video; I may 
even write a poem or a piece of music. Th ere are numerous possibilities, which in 
turn create numerous, oft en multimodal, texts that are not equivalent to one another. 
Not only does the text structure existing languages, but it also creates new ones. Th e 
text thus becomes a sort of a “semiotic condenser”, a result of the “precipitation” of a 
particular message from the semiotic multilingual continuum.
Lotman’s model of a polyglot text in fact challenged the linguocentric dogma of 
the 1970s and especially the infamous dichotomy of primary vs. secondary modelling 
systems adopted by Soviet semioticians, in which natural language is considered to 
be the primary modelling system and all other semiotic systems are built upon it. 
Already in 1971, Lotman and his colleague Boris Uspenskij directly questioned the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and Benveniste’s contention that language determines one’s 
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culture (and therefore consciousness) and argued that languages are inseparable from 
culture (Lotman, Uspensky 1978). 
However, does this mean that Lotman somehow diminishes the importance of 
natural language? On the contrary, he especially notes that natural language is the 
most powerful sign system:
We are immersed in the space of language. Even in the most basic abstract 
conditions, we cannot extract ourselves from this space, which simply envelops 
us, and yet it is a space of which we are also a part and which, simultaneously, is 
part of us. […] We need to exert a tremendous eff ort to push ourselves beyond the 
limits of language and it is precisely to language that we ascribe our lies, deviations 
from the norm, and the majority of our defects and perversions. (Lotman 2009: 114)
Language permeates many semiotic systems (cinema, theatre, etc.), acting as “material” 
for them (for example, literature or poetry produce new meanings by altering language 
structure). In comparison with other semiotic systems, natural language also has the 
highest symbolic capacity, which allows it to be highly open to translation from other 
systems (refl ected, for example, in ekphrasis). 
It is interesting in that respect that Lotman describes rhetoric, or metaphor in a 
very general sense, as the minimal dialogic device that shift s the normative structure 
of language and allows for creation of new meanings. Lotman (1990: 49) argues 
that metaphor brings “the alien” from the outside and is not an intrinsic element of 
language. Language polysemy, synonymy, metaphors, and tropes are thus a direct 
consequence of a polyglot consciousness applied to the structure of language, and 
language is but one manifestation of our general semiotic capacity.1 
Semiosphere as extended mind 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, Lotman extends the study of textuality onto larger 
semiotic entities and writes extensively on culture as a hierarchy of texts within texts, 
in which semiotic polyglottism (multilingualism) and the asymmetry of semiotic 
space function as its main internal mechanisms (see Lotman 1970, 1974, 1977[1970], 
1982, 1984b, 1987a, 1992b, 1994; Lotman et al. 2013[1973]; Lotman, Uspensky 2013). 
1 To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the term “polyglot consciousness” can also be 
found in Mikhail Bakhtin’s works (e.g., in Bakhtin 1975: 430). However, Bakhtin emphasizes the 
uniqueness of individual voices of presumably the same language (polyphony, heteroglossia), 
whereas Lotman emphasizes the dialogue of diff erent languages as the minimal condition for 
meaning generation. For more on Bakhtin and Lotman see, e.g., Reid 1990; Kim Su Kvan 2003: 
119–130; Semenenko 2012: 47–51.
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Developing his holistic approach to culture, Lotman pays attention to other relevant 
domains such as the problem of artifi cial intelligence, brain asymmetry (e.g., Lotman 
1979[1977], 1983, 1992c, 2005), and also biology, oft en drawing parallels between 
culture and the organism (see a comprehensive overview in Kull 1999). 
It is therefore no coincidence that Lotman fi rst used the term semiosphere in 
a paper presented at the Eighth Estonian Spring School on Th eoretical Biology in 
May 1982 (Kull 2015: 260). Th e term then appeared in print in the article “On the 
semiosphere” published in Trudy po znakovym sistemam [Sign Systems Studies] 17 
(Lotman 1984a). At the time, Lotman was primarily inspired by the works of the 
Russian geologist Vladimir Vernadsky on the noosphere and the biosphere of the 
Earth. In his seminal work Th e Biosphere (1926), Vernadsky, aft er the geologist 
Eduard Suess, described the biosphere as “a life-saturated envelope of the Earth’s 
crust” and studied the living organisms of the biosphere as “a particular body that 
cannot be entirely reduced to known physico-chemical systems” (Vernadsky 1998: 
52). Th ese ideas strongly resonated with Lotman’s views on the principles of semiosis 
and the process of meaning generation. In a letter from 1982, Lotman (1997: 629–
630) develops Vernadsky’s postulate that life emerges from life and cannot emerge 
from inert matter, and states that any text must be preceded by another text and any 
developed civilization by another developed civilization. In the same vein, he says 
that any thought can originate only in another thought: “Only the antecedence of the 
semiotic sphere makes a message a message. Only the existence of intellect [razum] 
explains the existence of intellect”. In other words, Lotman reformulates his crucial 
postulate that the complex is primary and the simple is secondary, not vice versa, 
or, in the words of Mihhail Lotman (2014: 23), “simple models are the result of the 
investigator’s abstraction or the result of reduction or degeneration of complicated 
systems”. Just as the text is primary in relation to the sign, the unit of semiosis, “the 
smallest functioning mechanism is not the separate language but the whole semiotic 
space of the culture in question. Th is is the space we term the semiosphere” (Lotman 
1990: 125; original emphasis). 
Lotman especially stresses that the semiosphere is not just a static conglomerate of 
separate fi xed semiotic systems or languages but a necessary condition for any act of 
communication to take place and any language to appear:
Th e semiotic universe may be regarded as the totality of individual texts and isolated 
languages as they relate to each other. In this case, all structures will look as if they 
are constructed out of individual bricks. However, it is more useful to establish a 
contrasting view: all semiotic space may be regarded as a unifi ed mechanism (if 
not organism). In this case, primacy does not lie in one or another sign, but in the 
“greater system”, namely the semiosphere. Th e semiosphere is that same semiotic 
space, outside of which semiosis itself cannot exist. (Lotman 2005: 208)
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Lotman points out that in contrast to the noosphere, which is a three-dimensional 
material space,
[...] the space of the semiosphere carries an abstract character. Th is, however, is 
by no means to suggest that the concept of space is used, here, in a metaphorical 
sense. We have in mind a specifi c sphere, possessing signs, which are assigned 
to the enclosed space. Only within such a space is it possible for communicative 
processes and the creation of new information to be realised. (Lotman 2005: 207; 
emphasis added, A. S.)
In other words, Lotman makes an important point that the semiosphere is not just 
another metaphor for “all the signs en masse” but is rather a concrete collective mental 
sphere in which all communication and meaning generation occurs. 
Probably the most important aspect of the concept of semiosphere is that it 
emphasizes the idea that cognition is not solely an internal process but develops and 
is eff ectuated through interaction with other individuals, material objects, and other 
phenomena of reality. Formulated in this manner, the semiosphere is precursor of the 
notion of extended mind, which became increasingly popular aft er its introduction 
by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998). Th ey developed a simple idea that mind 
is not limited to the processes in the head and extends to our environment. Th is 
implied, among other things, that language “is not a mirror of our inner states but a 
complement to them” and that the self is extended as well (Clarks, Chalmers 1998: 18). 
Th is active externalism has found a wide acceptance, for example, in Merlin Donald’s 
(2001) theory, which describes human consciousness in terms of a cognitive-cultural 
distributed network, or in Robert Logan’s (2007) model of extended mind, or in 
Richard Menary’s (2007) integrationist hypothesis, and in many other works (e.g., 
Cowley, Vallée-Tourangeau 2013; Fusaroli et al. 2014). 
 Lotman’s emphasis on the externality of the mind was in part his reaction to the 
dominant scientism and neophrenological tendencies of the 1960s–80s when the 
asymmetry of the human brain was studied as a possible neurophysiological basis 
of thought and consciousness. Th e majority of these studies were characterized by 
a pronounced universalistic and “naturalistic” bias and a simplistic reductionism 
that pictured the hemispheres as representing two “languages”, two models of 
consciousness that refl ect the world in diff erent ways (see more in Semenenko 2011; 
2015). Nowadays, history is almost repeating itself with phrenological and “biologistic” 
discourses oft en coming to the fore, although they do meet with some criticism (the 
most vivid example of which is Tallis 2011). Already in the 1980s, Lotman showed that 
in order to understand human culture it is not necessary to go deep inside the brain 
and attempt to fi nd the answers in its microstructure, but rather one has to look at the 
semiotic space that envelops us and makes up our conscious experience. 
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Semiosphere as collective consciousness
In his presentation of the concept, Lotman (1984a: 22) defi nes all semiospheric levels – 
from human personality to the text to larger semiotic unities (e.g., culture) – as 
“semiospheres inserted into one another”, thus reiterating his thesis that culture is 
isomorphic with the individual consciousness (intellect). Consequently, culture 
becomes an extension of a human mind, a universal mind, and an individual mind 
in turn becomes a microculture. Th e semiosphere represents not only the collective 
mental sphere of humankind but also becomes a model of human cognition, congenial 
to the notion of pre-language semiotic capacity or modelling property, which is 
advocated by a number of scholars including Th omas Sebeok (1988: 77).2 From that 
point of view, our ability to create, operate and modify new signs, texts, and sign 
systems is unparalleled by other species and turns out to be one of the most important 
features of Homo sapiens. 
Th e thesis of the inherent dialogic predisposition of humans is supported by the 
recent studies of infant communication (see, e.g., Trevarthen 2011; Zlatev, Andrén 
2009; Tomasello 1999). Lotman himself (inspired by a 1978 article of John Newson)3 
refers to the situation when the need for dialogue between the mother and her 
newborn child creates unique messages and languages. Indeed, as any parent knows, 
a child fi rst develops the idiosyncratic family-specifi c dialect, and only then learns 
the normative language. As Deacon (1997: 135) argues, children acquire language 
fi rst through its structure, quickly learning “the most global structure-function 
relationships of utterances” and only then diff erentiate between individual symbols. 
Th is process is evident in children’s typical mistakes (e.g., ‘goed’ instead of ‘went’ in 
2 As is known, Ferdinand de Saussure (1966: 10) reduced this semiotic property to linguistic 
capacity: “Th ere exists a more general faculty which governs signs and which would be the 
linguistic faculty proper”. Most recently, Hauser and Chomsky, among others, argued that 
only the notion of the language faculty in the narrow sense (FLN), by which they understand 
recursion, is a uniquely human feature, although they do not discuss how this feature could 
have occurred in the fi rst place (Hauser et al. 2010). For Lotman, this approach would be too 
narrow and linguocentric because for him language is a direct product of our qualitatively and 
quantitatively diff erent forms of modelling.
3 Newson’s (1978: 41, 42) conclusion could especially have caught Lotman’s attention: “To 
sum up: the dialogue between a human infant and his regular caretaker represents a ‘cultural 
construction’ of the utmost importance to the infant’s whole future development. In attempting 
to describe the complexities of interaction during the fi rst year of life, the very notion of 
dialogue is inescapable, and can most fruitfully be conceptualised as an alternating sequence 
of communication gestures. […] From the baby’s point of view it is only by being continually 
involved, as a participant actor, within an almost infi nite number of such sequences that he is 
fi nally brought into the community of language. In short, it is only because he is treated as a 
communicator that he learns the essential human art of communication”. 
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English or ‘gedde’ in place for ‘gav’ [‘gave’] in Swedish), which demonstrate their 
mastery of the dominant structures of language and that they only later learn that it 
is full of irregularities and exceptions. Th is also is a remarkable refl ection of Lotman’s 
idea of the primacy of the text before the sign (see Lotman 1981, 2005: 205): the text 
creates its language and not vice versa. 
In other words, children at fi rst deploy a holistic mode in communication and 
only then slowly learn to distinguish between diff erent sign systems. Th e “mystery” of 
language acquisition no longer seems mysterious if we acknowledge that children are 
exposed not to only one language but also to the semiosphere. Being immersed in a 
multimodal and multilingual environment from their very birth, children undergo a 
long and intensive process of interacting with the existing collective mind and only aft er 
some time (approximately fi ve years) become fully functional semiotically. Children’s 
polyglot potential does not develop on its own; it needs constant stimulation. Th e case 
of feral children shows most vividly what happens to someone deprived of the contact 
with the semiosphere. Th e virtually unlimited semiotic capacity of children also 
manifests itself in the case of home signers, deaf children who exhibit a clear ability 
to create ad hoc signs and even sign systems (e.g., Goldin-Meadow 1993; Goldin-
Meadow, Mylander 1998). On a group level, this ability to create conventional sign 
systems is also evident in the case of Bedouin and Nicaraguan sign languages (Arbib 
2012: 296–321) and aboriginal sign languages (Sebeok 1991: 128–167). 
The anthropocentric semiosphere vs. animal semiosis
Since Lotman’s death in 1993, the concept of semiosphere has been interpreted 
in various ways (e.g., as the world of multiple truths, the set of all interconnected 
umwelten, the totality of interconnected signs; see Kull 2005: 178–80). Jesper 
Hoff meyer (1997) coined the same term in 1993 as well, independently of Lotman, and 
defi ned it more broadly as a global semiosphere comprising the totality of life processes 
in the world, “a semiotic dimension” of the biosphere. Some other scholars also 
emphasize the connection of the semiosphere with the biosphere: Petrilli and Ponzio 
(2005: 551) maintain that “from the perspective of global semiotics, the semiosphere 
converges with the biosphere and can be characterized as the semiobiosphere” (original 
emphasis). Th e human semiosphere thus becomes a part of a larger semiobiosphere, 
the sphere of all life and semiosis. Winfried Nöth (2006: 258) notes in a similar vein:
Th e concepts of bio- and semiosphere must hence be revised as follows: biosphere 
and semiosphere are not two separate spheres of the universe, but the biosphere is 
included in the semiosphere, and semiosis begins with life, if not in the physical 
world before life appears. 
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In their overview of the concept, Kaie Kotov and Kalevi Kull (2011: 191) defi ne the 
semiosphere as “the relational biosphere” and “the set of relations that comprises 
everything living”. Th ey make an important correction noting that if the biosphere is 
understood in Vernadsky’s terms, as a physical entity, the matter, it is not identical to 
the semiosphere. Anton Markoš (2014: 496) makes yet another attempt to unify the 
two notions and defi nes life as “a system born, endowed with semiosis, with history”. 
Mihhail Lotman (2014: 25) makes what is probably the clearest distinction between 
the semiosphere and the biosphere as “the relationship between two possible worlds”, 
the former governed by semiotic mechanisms and the latter governed by the laws of 
physics and biology. Finally, other theories have a remote relation to Lotman’s original 
concept, like the concept of the symbolosphere as a part of the semiosphere, the 
sphere of symbolic signs only (see Logan, Schumann 2005; Logan 2007 – the authors, 
however, do not provide any reference either to Lotman or Hoff meyer).
It seems, then, that the majority of contemporary studies follow Hoff meyer’s much 
broader defi nition. For Lotman, as we have seen, the semiosphere is a product fi rst 
and foremost of a conscious human mind. For example, already in Th e Structure of the 
Artistic Text, Lotman (1977: 7) refuses to call biochemical regulation of signals in the 
nervous system a language because this process does not involve a conscious mind. 
Th is anthropocentrism was predetermined by Lotman’s focus on the uniqueness of 
human culture because if one extends intelligence (in Lotman’s sense) to bees and even 
chemical reactions, there appears to be nothing specifi c about human cognition. In 
that sense especially, Nöth’s extension of semiosphere into the physical world directly 
contradicts both Vernadsky’s and Lotman’s contention that life is opposed to inert 
matter.
Th e virtue of Lotman’s understanding of the semiosphere is that it functions both 
as an object of analysis and a metaconcept (see Torop 2005: 164–65; Kull 2005: 184), 
a tool for the study of human cognition. It is especially noticeable in those rare cases 
when Lotman – primarily in Th e Unpredictable Workings of Culture (1989) and Culture 
and Explosion (1992) – discusses nonhuman forms of semiosis to illustrate his thesis 
of the uniqueness of human consciousness. One of the major points of diff erence 
for Lotman is the dialogicity and polyglottism of human semiosphere. For example, 
when Lotman discusses symbolic behaviour of animals, he notes that the dialogue 
between animals essentially diff ers from the dialogue between humans: animals 
use one concrete language that eliminates ambivalence in communication, and the 
interpretive possibilities of any message in animal interaction are predetermined. Th at 
is also why there is a great discrepancy between human dialogue and the “one-sided 
animal-training” (Lotman 2005: 218). Human communication, in contrast, always 
presupposes a confl ict between collective and individual memory, between various 
individual languages (Lotman 2014: 54–55). 
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Homo sapiens is the only species that is polyglot in two senses: it is collectively 
polyglot, speaking roughly about seven thousand languages, and also individually 
polyglot in the sense that humans are using, creating and altering a variety of semiotic 
systems. As was shown earlier, these languages are not equivalent to one another, 
but at the same time they are mutually interprojected and have various degrees of 
translatability. Th e continuous dialogue between these languages creates tension, 
which is necessary for the generation of meaning. As a consequence, we can create 
multivalent and unpredictable texts, that is, “art”, in which the informative function is 
overshadowed by the creative one. Lotman (2014: 165) goes on to state that the human 
ability to refl ect is “essentially impossible without art”, reiterating his thesis from the 
earlier period that art functions as a cognitive device: it perceives life not analytically 
but by recreating reality by its own means, thus being an indispensable tool of thought 
(see Lotman 2011; Lotman 1977: 18, 250–51). 
An important remark that needs to be made here is that the polyglot consciousness 
is not synonymous with multimodal communication and cannot be reduced to it. In 
recent decades, the linguocentric view of human culture that focused primarily on 
spoken language has been challenged by gesture research, highlighting the multimodal 
aspect of human semiosis and the role of gestures in cognition of modern humans (see 
Kendon 2004; Lieberman 2000; Armstrong 1999).4 Nevertheless, to argue that human 
cognition is essentially multimodal is not enough. Many species that communicate 
multimodally remain essentially monoglot because in their communication systems 
diff erent modalities are used within one sign system. In this kind of system any 
signal or message is unequivocal and excludes (mis)interpretation. Th e signifi er in a 
monoglot system refers only to one stable signifi ed, and deviations from the “hard-
wired” code are anomalous and rare. On the contrary, the sign produced by the 
polyglot consciousness, as described by Peirce (CP 2.303), is always a part of an endless 
chain of signifi ers that produces an infi nite number of meanings. As a consequence, 
humans require texts with a high degree of autocommunicative function, as opposed 
to momentary auditory and/or visual messages of other species. 
In autocommunication the message is transmitted not between two 
diff erent physical entities but a person addresses him/herself. Th e function of 
autocommunication is not only mnemonic – in that case one individual functions 
4 Th ese studies provide serious counterarguments against the existence of the hypothesized 
innate hierarchical structure of language, advocated primarily by Noam Chomsky and Steven 
Pinker (1994). For example, Deacon 1997, Armstrong 1999, Tomasello 1999, and Lieberman 
2000 all demonstrate that language is a learned skill that makes use of a distributed network, 
including the neocortex and subcortical basal ganglia. As Deacon (1997: 310) puts it, the 
evolution of human brain is “more an adaptation of the brain to language than an adaptation 
of the brain for language” (original emphasis).
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as two, transmitting a message in time (Lotman 1977: 8–9) – but also meaning-
generating. In autocommunication, it is not the message but the code and the context 
that change, and the message, which is already “received” by the addressee, acquires 
new meaning through reinterpretation. Autocommunication lies at the core of all 
communication but is especially evident in mythological texts that are designed to 
preserve the model of the universe (Lotman 1990: 153; Lotman, Uspenskij 1977). 
Interestingly, in one of his interviews from 1990, Lotman compares animal beha-
viour and “language” to “our language of folklore”, that is, myth. He goes on to state 
that the unpredictability of humans gave them an evolutionary advantage over other 
species: 
[Animal] behavior is a language similar to our language of folklore. It is repeated 
as the same, and every time created anew. Humans, however, consider the repeated 
forms of behavior to be secondary, and promote unexpected behavior. Evidently, 
man when he appeared resembled a mad animal, and I suppose that was the reason 
why this relatively weak creature could survive and kill much bigger animals. Th ey 
were not able to predict his behavior. (Quoted in Kull 1999: 124).
Furthermore, the dialogicity of our consciousness has a direct impact on our beha-
viour. Lotman emphasizes that animals are fully subordinated to the biological law of 
cyclical reiteration whereas humans are only partially subject to it:
Cyclical reiteration is a law of biological existence; the animal world (and the 
world of man as part of this world) is subordinate to it. However, man is not fully 
submerged in this world: as a “thinking reed” – he constantly fi nds himself at odds 
with the basic laws of his surroundings. (Lotman 2009: 28)
If humans diff erentiate between the past, the present, and the future, “the cyclical 
world of nature equates past and future” and eff ectively replaces prediction with 
memory (Lotman 2014: 165). Animal behaviour is therefore ritualistic, whereas 
humans are able to break the rules and become unpredictable. Animals “play by the 
rules”; humans may “cheat” and lie, that is, use “an unmotivated and disinterested 
untruth” (Lotman 2009: 129). 
Lotman repeatedly emphasizes that the confl ict between the collective and the 
individual, that is, the ability “to break the rules”, seems to be the main driving force 
of our development. Th e conscious choice of a thinking individual becomes an active 
factor of historical development, which diff erentiates “human systems” from biological 
and artifi cial ones in particular (Lotman 1992a: 469–70). From the point of view of an 
animal, humans are, in Lotman’s words, “insane” creatures who paradoxically depend 
on the ever-growing avalanche of semiotic systems and texts. Lotman (1979) notes 
that the capacity to “go out of one’s mind”, to behave in an unpredictable manner, is 
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a crucial feature of human intellect: a thinking mechanism must in principle be able 
to “go mad”, as an alternative to rational behaviour. Culture, in this respect, can be 
described as a mechanism of collective intelligence because it too has “pathological”, 
irregular periods in its functioning, described as “cultural explosions” (Lotman 2009). 
Th is “anomaly” paradoxically makes it possible for us to refl ect on the boundaries of 
our own umwelt – the semiotic sphere of an organism as the organism perceives it5 – 
and to conceive of other umwelten.6 
Th e aforementioned oppositions can be helpful for understanding the diff erences 
between human and nonhuman semiosis (Table 1).

















One reason why the semiosphere has become such an infl uential concept in semiotics 
is that it can be used both as a description of the entire sphere of semiosis and as 
a model of human cognition. As this article strove to demonstrate, Juri Lotman’s 
narrow, anthropocentric, understanding of the semiosphere highlights the fact that 
only humans can be considered polyglot both collectively and individually. In the 
fi nal analysis, the cumulative cultural evolution of humans or the so-called “ratchet 
5 Th e concept of umwelt was introduced by Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) and, although 
not used by Lotman, is functionally similar to the concept of the individual semiosphere. On 
umwelt and the semiosphere see, e.g., Mihhail Lotman 2002.
6 A number of studies of “animal cultures” vaguely defi ne culture as “group-specifi c behavior 
that is at least partly acquired from social infl uences” (McGrew 1998: 322), thus ignoring the 
crucial diff erences between nonhuman and human cultures. Another group of studies have 
searched for evidence of the theory of mind in nonhuman primates, but even in the most 
optimistic view, even if it can be surmised that some animals do have mental state concepts, it 
cannot be argued that they are able to refl ect about their own or somebody else’s mental states 
(Heyes 1998). 
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eff ect” (Tennie et al. 2009) and the unprecedented scale of cultural inheritance and 
niche construction (e.g., Odling-Smee, Laland 2011; Laland, Hoppitt 2003; Sinha 
2009) can only be explained by the fact that our species somehow managed to transfer 
and preserve information in the external collective semiosphere. Th at is, they became 
semiotically polyglot beings. Th e question of how exactly our ancestors managed 
to go beyond the restrains of the animal semiotic threshold and their own umwelt 
remains the “hardest problem of science” (Christiansen, Kirby 2003), and answering 
it extends beyond the goals of the present paper. However, as we have seen, Lotman’s 
focus on the polyglot structure of human collective consciousness makes an important 
contribution to the question of human vs. nonhuman semiosis and may be useful for 
the further study of human cognition and human evolution. 7 
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Homo polyglottus: семиосфера как модель сознания 
Понятие семиосферы Юрия Лотмана трактуется сейчас достаточно широко и имеет 
многочисленные интерпретации. Эта статья возвращается к первоначальному «антропо-
центрическому» толкованию семиосферы как коллективного интеллекта/сознания 
и анализирует то, как Лотман подходит к вопросу уникальности человека и каким 
образом он подчеркивает разницу между семиозисом человека и других животных. В 
отличие от большинства работ, которые фокусируются на символическом сознании и 
мультимодальности как главных отличительных признаках человека как вида, Лотман 
выделяет диалогичность и полиглотизм как основу человеческой культуры. В этой 
трактовке семиосфера представляет собой важный инструмент для изучения сознания 
человека и его когнитивной эволюции.
Homo polyglottus: semiosfäär kui inimkognitsiooni mudel
Võib väita, et semiosfäär on kõige mõjukam Juri Lotmani poolt välja töötatud mõistetest, 
ning sellele on antud mitmesuguseid uustõlgendusi. Artiklis naastakse Lotmani algse “antro-
potsentrilise” semiosfäärikäsitluse juurde kollektiivse intellekti/teadvusena ning väisatakse 
Lotmani peamiseid argumente tema arutelus inim- vs. mitteinimsemioosi üle, paigutamaks 
seda kognitiivsemiootika ning eriti inimliku ainulaadsuse küsimuse moodsasse konteksti. 
Erinevalt suuremast osast uurimustest, mis keskenduvad sümboolsele teadvusele ja multi-
modaalsele kommunikatsioonile kui eriomaselt inimlikele joontele, rõhutab Lotman 
inimkultuuri ainu laadsete joontena polüglotismi ja dialoogilisust. Sel kombel sõnastatuna 
kasutatakse semiosfääri mõistet kontseptuaalse raamina nii inimtunnetuse kui ka inimeste 
kognitiivse evolutsiooni uurimisel. 
